Free Will may be an Illusion, but Human Need to Believe It Exists

In Nagel’s seminal work, he raises the spectre of determinism, asserting that our actions are inexorably bound by circumstances existing before their occurrence, owing to the prevailing laws of nature. If determinism holds true, the predictability of actions denies the existence of free will. However, accepting determinism leads to a conceptual impasse, a philosophical "dead end" as per Nagel. This essay delves into the notion that while free will may be illusory, it is a belief intrinsic to the human psyche, essential for the maintenance of moral responsibility.

In everyday discourse, the nexus between moral responsibility and free will is a recurring theme. Legal frameworks presume human agency based on the assumption of free will, where individuals possess the capacity to comprehend and regulate their actions. The acceptance of determinism threatens established ethical and legal norms, potentially destabilizing societal structures. Even if free will is illusory, its belief remains indispensable to the preservation of ethical frameworks and legal systems.

Human existence is portrayed as a continuum of causal events, each moment tethered to the next by an intricate web of circumstances. Individuals are, in essence, spectators in their own lives, experiencing a personalized chain of events from birth to death. Simultaneously, objective chains manifest, shaping cultures, languages, and traditions that influence human character. Acknowledging the inevitability of change, individuals traverse a journey where openness to possibilities is paramount. The unpredictability of encounters with new experiences fosters continual evolution, rendering absolute control over change an impossibility.

Actions are posited as reflections of desires, and desires emanate from the deeper self, constituting one's character. Wolf's deep-self view emphasizes that individuals, as responsible agents, are guided by their wills, embedded within the recesses of their deeper selves. While individuals shape their characters, they are not the masters of their deepest selves. The dynamic interplay between the creation and governance of one's character unfolds within the context of external influences. The responsible agent, according to Wolf, must be held accountable when their deep self is rational.

Wolf rebuts determinism by asserting that moral responsibility persists as individuals possess the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong. The ability to change one's character and actions is contingent upon the choices made in response to new information and diverse perspectives. Even in cases where a misguided deeper self is moulded by external influences, the potential for transformation arises through exposure to alternative knowledge. The absence of a fixed natural law dictating an inability to change reinforces the importance of individual agency in the face of determinism.

While neuroscience delineates the mechanisms governing neuro-interactions, it does not inherently endorse determinism. The observable level of neuro-interactions adheres to laws, yet the inherent unpredictability of human consciousness introduces an element of open possibilities. Individuals, though physically grounded, possess the ability to think and adapt in response to unpredictable events. Despite being ensnared in their circumstances, the presence of self-awareness enables individuals to introspect and potentially reform their deeper selves, underscoring the non-deterministic nature of the universe.

In summary, this essay contends that Wolf's Sane Deep-Self view provides a compelling response to determinism, and neuroscience fortifies her position by acknowledging the unpredictability inherent in human consciousness. While the question of free will's existence remains open-ended, the need for moral responsibility persists. Individuals, whether endowed with free will, should be held accountable for their actions. The tension between determinism and the human capacity for change highlights the complex interplay of philosophical concepts that underpin our understanding of agency and responsibility.

Citations:

Nagel, T. (1987) ‘Free Will’ in Nagel, T (ed.) What Does It All Mean? A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy. Oxford University Press, p.47-58

Roskies, R. (2006) ‘Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility’, ScienceDirect, 10(9), p419-422

Wolf, S. (1987) 'Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility' in Ferdinand Schoemann, (ed.), Responsibility, Character and the Emotions, Cambridge University Press, pp. 372-387